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Abstract—This paper considers a cooperative device-to-device
(D2D) communication system, where the D2D transmitters (DTs)
act as relays to assist cellular users (CUs) in exchange for the
opportunities to use licensed spectrum. Based on the interaction
of each D2D pair and each CU, we formulate the pairing problem
between multiple CUs and multiple D2D pairs as a one-to-
one matching game. Unlike most existing works, we consider
a realistic scenario with incomplete channel information. Thus,
each CU lacks enough information to establish its preference
over D2D pairs. Therefore, traditional matching algorithms are
not suitable for our scenario. To this end, we convert the matching
game to an equivalent non-cooperative game, and then propose a
novel learning algorithm, which converges to a stable matching.
Index Terms—Cooperative D2D communication, matching
game, incomplete information.
I. INTRODUCTION
R
ECENTLY, D2D communication has been extensively
studied to provide better user experience. To implement
this technology, one of the key issues is how to share li-
censed spectrum efficiently without degrading CUs’ perfor-
mance greatly. We consider a cooperative D2D communication
scheme, which exploits the advantages of cooperative relay
and D2D communication [1]. The basic idea is that DTs act as
relays for CUs in exchange for the transmission opportunities
on the CUs’ channels. Thus, a win-win situation is achieved,
which motivates CUs to share their spectrum with D2D pairs
even if they have no surplus resource.
Most existing works [1]–[4] assume complete information,
such as channel state information (CSI). However, collecting
global information incurs heavy overhead, and thus may be not
practical in large-scale networks. Besides, some information
may be difficult to acquire, such as the CSI between CUs and
DTs. Moreover, the latency requirement of some applications
is stringent, such as D2D-based vehicle-to-vehicle communi-
cations. These facts motivate us to study distributed resource
allocation scheme with incomplete information, where agents
make decisions independently based on local information.
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Game theory provides a framework to study the interactions
of autonomous agents. There have been many game theo-
retical solutions in D2D networks [5]. In our context, CUs
have preferences over D2D pairs and vice versa. Matching
theory offers a suitable tool to study the cooperation between
competitive CUs and competitive D2D pairs. There have
been some matching-based resource allocation schemes for
D2D communication [6]–[8]. In this paper, we formulate the
problem of pairing CUs with D2D pairs as a one-to-one
matching game to seek a stable matching.
In the literature, authors of [9] have considered the in-
complete information scenario, but do not investigate the
pairing problem. Besides, similar cooperative scheme has been
studied in cognitive radio networks recently [10]–[15], where
secondary users (SUs) relay primary users’ (PUs) traffic for
rewards of the transmission opportunities. Some works adopt
auction [10], dynamic Bayesian game [11], and Stackelberg
game [12] to tackle the incomplete information. Moreover,
the authors of [13] consider the incomplete information in
the matching game model. However, above works [10]–[13]
assume PU has the knowledge of the relay rates, which depend
on the SUs’ local information. In practice, such information
is usually not known globally. In this paper, we consider a
stronger incomplete information scenario, where CUs have
no knowledge of the relay rates provided by the D2D pairs.
The authors of [14], [15] consider the similar information
assumption, but only consider single PU case. Instead, we
consider the case with multiple CUs and multiple D2D pairs.
This paper focuses on the uplink resource sharing with in-
complete information, because mobile devices are more likely
to need help due to limited power budget. We formulate the
pairing problem as a one-to-one matching game, based on the
interaction between each CU and each D2D pair. Such interac-
tion is described by Nash bargaining solution (NBS). Because
the relay rates are unknown, CUs cannot establish preferences
over D2D pairs. Thus, traditional matching algorithms, such as
Gale-Shapley (GS) algorithm, are not suitable for our scenario.
To the best of our knowledge, it is the first attempt to address
the matching game with unknown preference. To overcome
the difficulty, we convert the matching game to an equivalent
non-cooperative game. At each period, each CU selects a D2D
pair and a corresponding time allocation, and obtains a payoff
as feedback. Based on the feedback, we propose a learning
algorithm, which is proven to converge to a stable matching
in probability. Moreover, the corresponding time allocation
converges to the result of NBS with probability 1.
2Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3
(1 ) / 2
mn
a- (1 ) / 2
mn
a-
mn
a
BS BS BS
CU m CU m CU m
DR nDT n DR nDT n DR nDT n
Fig. 1: Frame structure for cooperation.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
A. System Model
We consider uplink resource sharing of a single cell with a
base station (BS) denoted by b and M CUs. The set of CUs
is denoted by M. Besides, there are N D2D pairs, and the
set of them is denoted by N . Each D2D pair contains one
DT and one D2D receiver (DR). In this paper, we assume
M ≤ N . However, the proposed algorithm can be applied to
the case where M > N . CU m has been assigned to one cellular
channel, namely channel m. There is no dedicated channel for
D2D pairs. Therefore, D2D pairs relay the uplink traffic in
exchange for access to the cellular channels.
We assume that each CU is assisted by at most one D2D
pair, and each D2D pair can relay at most one CU due to
limited battery capacity [2]. Similar to [13]–[15], we take the
decode-and-forward protocol with parallel channel coding [16]
as an example. When CU m cooperates with D2D pair n, the
normalized frame consists of three phases, as shown in Fig.1.
The first two phases both last
1−αmn
2
and are used for the
relay transmission for the CU. Specifically, CU m broadcasts
its data with power pc to the BS and DT n at first. Then, DT
n forwards received signal to the BS with power pd. The third
phase lasts αmn and is used by DT n to transmit its data with
power pd to DR n. We refer to αmn ∈ A , [αL, αU ] as time
allocation.
The expected rate of CU m in direct link is
RCm = E
[
ln
(
1 +
pchmb
n0
)]
, (1)
where hmb is the channel gain from CU m to the BS and n0
denotes the noise power.
For simplicity, we assume every DT can decode all the CUs’
data in the first phase. Thus, cooperating with D2D pair n, the
rate of CU m in the first two phases is
rCmn =
1
2
[
ln
(
1 +
pchmb
n0
)
+ ln
(
1 +
pdh
m
nb
n0
)]
, (2)
where hm
nb
is the channel gain from DT n to the BS on channel
m. Let RCmn = E[r
C
mn], and thus with time allocation αmn,
the expected rate of CU m during the entire frame is R˜Cmn =
(1 − αmn)R
C
mn. Moreover, the expected rate of D2D pair n
during the entire frame is given by
R˜Dmn(αmn) = αmnE
[
ln
(
1 +
pch
m
nn
n0
)]
, αmnR
D
mn, (3)
where hmnn is the channel gain of D2D pair n on channel m.
Assume that for each D2D link, the channel gains are i.i.d.
across all the channels. Thus, we have RDmn = R
D
m′n
,∀m,∀m′ ∈
M, and the value of RDmn is denoted by R
D
n .
Information Assumption: CU m only knows RCm and has no
knowledge of RCmn and R
D
n , and D2D pair n only knows R
D
n .
After cooperating with D2D pair n at period t, CU m gets a
sample rCmn(t) following a fixed unknown distribution.
B. Matching Based Framework
1) Bargaining Game for CU-D2D Pair (m, n): To incen-
tivize CU and D2D pair to cooperate mutually, a bargaining
game is used to characterize the interaction between them. If
CU m cooperates with D2D pair n, the CU’s utility UCmn and
the D2D pair’s utility UDmn are defined as
UCmn(αmn) = R˜
C
mn(αmn) − R
C
m, (4)
UDmn(αmn) = R˜
D
mn(αmn). (5)
We use NBS as the bargaining outcome to determine the
time allocation, and thus the cooperation satisfies some useful
properties and is beneficial for both sides. Hence, based on
the concept of NBS [17], the time allocation is given by the
following problem
max
αmn ∈A
(
UCmn(αmn) −U
C
min
) (
UDmn(αmn) −U
D
min
)
(6a)
s.t. UCmn(αmn) > U
C
min
,UDmn(αmn) > U
D
min
, (6b)
where UC
min
and UD
min
are the CU’s and the D2D pair’s utilities
respectively if they fail to reach an agreement. It is natural to
set UC
min
= UD
min
= 0. Thus, problem (6) is coincident with
proportional fairness scheme. Constraint (6b) guarantees that
both sides have incentive to participate in the cooperation.
Solving problem (6), the optimal time allocation is given by
α∗mn(R
C
mn) =
[
RCmn − R
C
m
2RCmn
]αU
αL
, (7)
where [x]ba = max(a,min(x, b)). Based on (7), the D2D pair
with higher relay rate can obtain larger transmission time.
Moreover, it is easy to verify that UCmn(α
∗
mn(R
C
mn)) is an
increasing function of RCmn, which reflects the fact that the CU
prefers to cooperate with the D2D pair offering higher relay
rate. We will use α∗mn(R
C
mn) and α
∗
mn interchangeably after-
wards. When the problem (6) is infeasible, for convenience,
we still let α∗mn be the associated time allocation, and thus
have UCmn(α
∗
mn) ≤ 0 in this case.
2) Matching Game Model: CU and D2D pair can only be
paired when they agree to cooperate mutually. Therefore, it
is reasonable to model the pairing problem between the set
of CUs and the set of D2D pairs as a one-to-one matching
game under two-sided preferences. CU m prefers D2D pair n
to D2D pair n′ (i.e., n ≻m n
′), if UCmn(α
∗
mn) > U
C
mn′
(α∗
mn′
).
Similarly, D2D pair n prefers CU m to CU m′ (i.e., m ≻n m
′),
if UDmn(α
∗
mn) > U
D
m′n
(α∗
m′n
), which is equivalent to α∗mn >
α∗
m′n
. Besides, if UCmn(α
∗
mn) > 0, D2D pair n is acceptable to
CU m, which is denoted by n ≻m ∅.
Mathematically, a matching is a function µ : M ∪ N →
M ∪ N ∪ {∅}, such that µ(m) = n if and only if µ(n) = m,
3and µ(m) ∈ N ∪ {∅}, µ(n) ∈ M ∪ {∅}, for ∀m ∈ M,∀n ∈ N .
Note that µ(x) = ∅ implies that user x is unmatched. We aim
to seek a stable matching (SM), which is the major solution
concept in matching game and defined as follows [18].
Definition 1: Let µ be a matching. A CU-D2D pair (m, n) is
a blocking pair if µ(m) , n, m ≻n µ(n) and n ≻m µ(m). µ is
individually rational if µ(m) ≻m ∅,∀m ∈ M. Thus, µ is stable
if it is individually rational and there is no blocking pair.
SM captures the preferences of both sides and CUs will only
be matched with acceptable D2D pairs in SM. The existence of
SM is guaranteed [18]. The challenge is that each CU cannot
establish its preference due to the unavailability of RCmn. Thus,
the traditional GS algorithm [18] cannot be used to seek SMs.
III. LEARNING FOR MATCHING WITH INCOMPLETE
INFORMATION
To overcome the difficulty, CU has to learn its preference
from the interactions with D2D pairs. To this end, we convert
the above matching game to an equivalent non-cooperative
game, which enables us to exploit the rich learning techniques
designed for non-cooperative game.
A. Equivalent Non-cooperative Game Model
We convert the matching game to a non-cooperative game
G = (M, {Bm}m∈M, {Chn}n∈N, {πm}m∈M ). Due to the prior-
ity of CUs on licensed spectrum, we let CUs be the players
to propose to D2D pairs. The action of CU m is to select a
D2D pair bm ∈ N , which means CU m proposes to cooperate
with D2D pair bm with time allocation α
∗
mbm
. Each CU can
refuse to cooperate with any D2D pairs, which is denoted by
action b0. Hence, the action set of CU m is Bm = N ∪ {b0}.
Given an action profile b = (b1, b2, · · · , bM ), each D2D pair
selects the CU offering the maximal time allocation among
the CUs proposing to it and rejects the others. If more than
one CUs offers the maximal time allocation, the D2D pair will
choose one of them based on a predefined rule. The CU chosen
by D2D pair n is denoted by Chn(b)
1, which can reflect the
preference of D2D pair n. Thus, the utility of CU m is:
πm(bm, b−m) =

UC
mbm
(α∗
mbm
) − θ, if Chbm (b) = m, bm , b0,
−θ, if Chbm (b) , m, bm , b0,
0, bm = b0,
(8)
where b−m is the action profile of all the CUs except CU m,
and θ > 0 is an arbitrarily small number and denotes
the negotiation cost. Assume θ is sufficiently small so that
UCmn(α
∗
mn) − θ > 0 if U
C
mn(α
∗
mn) > 0. In the first case,
θ makes sure that CUs only select acceptable D2D pairs
at equilibriums. The first two cases imply acceptance and
rejection of the CU’s proposal, respectively. The third case
means that the CU refuses to cooperate with any D2D pairs.
Given an action profile b, its associated matching µb is
obtained as follows: for ∀m ∈ M,∀n ∈ N , µb(m) = n and
1Mathematically, the choice function of D2D pair n can be represented
as Chn(b) = arg maxm∈Mn(b) {α
∗
mn + wm }, where Mn(b) is the set of
CU proposing to D2D pair n and wm is the bias assigned to CU m. The
bias is determined by the predefined rule, and satisfies that if α∗mn > α
∗
m′n
,
α∗mn + wm > α
∗
m′n
+ wm′ must hold.
µb(n) = m if and only if Chn(b) = m. Hence, the relationship
between the pure Nash equilibrium (PNE) of G and the SM
can be stated as follows, which implies that an SM can be
found via finding a PNE of G.
Theorem 1: If action profile b is a PNE, µb is an SM.
Conversely, if µ is an SM, there is a PNE b such that µb = µ.
Proof: On the one hand, let b be a PNE. We will prove
the stability of µb by contradiction. The individual rationality
is easy to verify. Suppose there is a blocking pair (m, n) in
µb. Thus, CU m can take action b
′
m = n to improve its utility,
which violates our assumption. Therefore, µb is stable.
On the other hand, let µ be an SM. We construct an action
profile b as follows: for CU m, if µ(m) = n, it takes action
bm = n and action b0 otherwise. We will prove that b is a PNE
by contradiction. Suppose b is not a PNE, so there exists a
CU m deviating to take action b′m , bm. If b
′
m = b0, µ is not
individually rational. Besides, If b′m ∈ N , there is a blocking
pair in µ. Thus, µ is not stable, which violates our assumption.
Therefore, b is a PNE.
To develop the learning algorithm, we show that G is a
weakly acyclic under better-replies game (WABRG), which
enables us to adopt better-reply with inertia (BRI) learning
algorithm [19] to find the PNE of G. WABRG means that from
any action profile, there is a better-reply path that terminates
in a PNE in a finite number of steps. A better-reply path is
a sequence of action profiles (b1, b2, · · · , bt, · · · ), where for
each t, there is a CU m such that btm , b
t−1
m , b
t
−m = b
t−1
−m
and πm(b
t ) > πm(b
t−1). In other words, in successive action
profiles, only one CU changes its action to improve its utility.
Theorem 2: The proposed game G is a WABRG.
Proof: Suppose b0 is not a PNE. We will construct a
better-reply path that ends at a PNE to prove the theorem.
If there are any rejected CUs, we let them take action
b0 successively to obtain b
1, b2, · · · , bt1 , such that the CUs
unmatched in µbt1 take action b0. Furthermore, according to
Theorem 2.33 in [18], there exists a finite sequence of match-
ings µ1, µ2, · · · , µk, · · · , µK , where µ1 = µbt1 , µK is stable,
and there is a blocking pair (mk, nk) for µk such that µk+1
is obtained from µk by satisfying the blocking pair (mk, nk).
Thus, we let CU m1 select D2D pair n1 to obtain b
t1+1.
Similarly, we let rejected CUs take action b0 successively to
obtain bt1+2, bt1+2, · · · , bt2 . Note that the above process will
not change the associated matching, i.e., µbt2 = µ2. Repeating
the above process, we can obtain an action profile btK such
that µbtK = µK and the unmatched CUs in µK take action b0.
Note that btK is exactly the constructed action profile in the
proof of Theorem 1, so it must be a PNE. Besides, it is easy
to find that the sequence b0, b1, · · · , btK is a better-reply path.
Hence, we can verify Theorem 2.
B. Learning Algorithm
Because each CU’s utility is related to RCmn, each CU
has to learn its utility from the interactions with D2D pairs.
Furthermore, the action of CU m can be redefined as a proposal
bˆm = (bm, α
∗
mbm
), where the time allocation is unknown
in the case of incomplete information. Therefore, CUs have
to make proposals explicitly to help D2D pairs establish
4Algorithm 1 Extended BRI with Q-learning (EBRI-Q)
1: Initialize RˆCmn(1), αˆ
1
m′n
, ∀n ∈N, ∀m′ ∈M and pˆim(b), ∀b ∈Πm′∈MBm′ .
2: for t = 2, 3 · · · ,T
3: With probability ε(t), uniformly select D2D pairs btm :
a) With probability ζ , choose the time allocation as αtm = α
t
mbtm
.
b) With probability 1 − ζ , choose the time allocation as αtm = αe .
4: With probability 1−ε(t), choose D2D pairs btm by following better reply
with inertia and choose αtm = α
t−1
mb
t
m
:
a) With probability ξ , select D2D pair btm = b
t−1
m .
b) With probability 1− ξ , select D2D pair btm according to the distribu-
tion, which is over the D2D pair selections that are better replies to
CU’s full memory of length L than bt−1m with respect to pˆim .
5: Observe joint proposal bˆt and choice of each D2D pair. Get achieved
rate rCmn(t) if cooperating with D2D pair n.
6: Update the estimation of RCmn, ∀n ∈ N:
Rˆ
C
mn(t) = Rˆ
C
mn(t−1)+λ(t)I(
ˆChn (bˆ
t ) = m)(rCmn(t)− Rˆ
C
mn(t −1)), (9)
where λ(t) = 1/(1 +
∑
t
τ=1
I( ˆChn(bˆ
τ ) = m)) and I(·) is indicator func-
tion.
7: Update its time allocation: αtmn = α
∗
mn(R
C
mn(t)), ∀n ∈ N.
8: Update time allocations of other CUs according to their proposals:
αˆt
m′n
=
{
αt
m′
, if bt
m′
= n and αt
m′
, αe
αˆt−1
m′n
, otherwise.
(10)
9: Update estimated utility with respect to joint D2D pair selection b =
(n, b−m), ∀n ∈ N, ∀b−m ∈ Πm′∈M\{m}Bm′ :
pˆim(b) =
{
(1 − αtmn)Rˆ
C
mn(t) − R
C
m − θ, if Chn(bˆ) = m
−θ, otherwise,
(11)
where bˆm = (n, α
t
mn) and bˆm′ = (bm, αˆ
t
m′bm′
) for m′ , m.
10: End for
their preferences. Specifically, at each period t, based on
history information, CU m makes proposal (btm, α
t
m), where
αtm is calculated using the estimation of R
C
mb
t
m
. Based on the
proposal profile bˆt = (bˆt
1
, bˆt
2
, · · · , bˆt
M
), D2D pair n selects the
CU offering the maximal time allocation, and the selected CU
is denoted by Cˆhn(bˆ
t ). After cooperation with D2D pair n, CU
m can update its estimation using observation rCmn. Besides, to
facilitate the learning process, CU m can also choose the time
allocation αe = αU + θ
′ to make sure it has enough chances to
cooperate with every D2D pair to obtain information, where
θ′ > 0 is an arbitrary small number. Hence, with D2D pair n
selected, CU m can choose αe for exploration.
Combining BRI and Q-learning, we propose a novel learn-
ing algorithm. The entire algorithm is depicted in Algorithm
1 for some CU m ∈ M. In step 3, CU m randomly selects
D2D pair for exploration with probability ε(t), where step 3-a
is used to announce time allocation αtmn to help other CUs
estimate their utilities. In step 4, with probability 1− ε(t), CU
m adopts BRI to learn a PNE of G using estimated utility πˆm.
In step 6, based on observations, CU m updates its estimation
of RCmn in Q-learning way. Then, CU m uses this updated
estimation to calculate the associated time allocation in step
7. In step 9, CU m uses other CUs’ announced time allocation
and αtmn to estimate utility function.
Theorem 3: With ε(t) = ε0t
−1/ML, the sequence {αtmn}
converges to the true value α∗mn with probability 1. Moreover,
the algorithm converges to an SM in probability. Specifically,
limt→∞ Pr{µbt is an SM} = 1, where b
t
= (bt
1
, bt
2
, · · · , bt
M
).
Proof: Let Ptmn denote the probability of CU m cooper-
ating with D2D pair n at period t. Thus,
∞∑
t=1
Ptmn ≥
∞∑
t=1
ζε(t)(1 − ε(t))M−1 ≥
∞∑
t=1
ζε0(1 − ε0)
M−1
t1/ML
= ∞.
So CU m will cooperate with D2D pair n infinitely often with
probability 1. Based on [19],
{
RˆCmn(t)
}
converges to RCmn with
probability 1. Since αtmn is a continuous function of Rˆ
C
mn(t),
we conclude that
{
αtmn
}
converges to α∗mn with probability 1.
On the one hand, if we replace the estimated utility πˆm
with the true utility πm in EBRI-Q, the D2D pair selection
process is exactly the stochastic BRI (SBRI) in [19]. Since
G is a WABRG, using lemma 5.17 in [19], we have that
limt→∞ Pr{b
t is PNE} = 1 in this case. On the other hand,
due to the step 3-a in EBRI-Q, the event that CU m′(m′ , m)
announces its time allocation αt
m′n
will happen infinitely often
with probability 1. So αˆt
m′n
converges to α∗
m′n
with probability
1. Moreover, considering the convergence of Rˆmn(t) and α
t
mn,
the estimated utility will be sufficiently close to the true utility
after an almost surely finite time. Thus, EBRI-Q will select
D2D pairs with exactly the same probabilities as SBRI. Hence,
based on Theorem 1, the convergence of µbt is verified.
Remark 1: On the one hand, larger memory length L
improves the robustness to the exploration behavior of other
D2D pairs, which may speed up the convergence rate of the
algorithm. On the other hand, Theorem 3 implies that the
exploration probability ε(t) decays more slowly with larger
L, which leads to slower convergence rate.
C. Implementation Issues
At the beginning of each frame, CUs will send their
proposals to the BS. Then, the BS broadcasts a proposal
list containing all the CUs’ proposals at a dedicated channel.
Meanwhile, all the D2D pairs will listen to this channel. After
receiving CUs’ proposals, each D2D pair will accept one of
them. Then, each matched D2D pair will send a feedback
to the BS using the channel occupied by its matched CU.
Based on these feedback, the BS obtains the final matching
and informs the result to the CUs. Thus, each CU knows its
partner and can begin its data transmission.
Except the above hand-shaking procedure, no extra over-
head is needed in the proposed algorithm.Thus, each iteration
has low signaling overhead. Note that (9)-(11) can be calcu-
lated in constant time. Moreover, the estimated utility is only
needed in BRI. Thus, according to BRI, the algorithm only
needs to estimate
∑
t−1
τ=t−L πm(b, b
τ
−m),∀b ∈ N . Therefore, the
computational complexity of each iteration is O(LN).
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS
Simulation results are presented to evaluate the performance
of the proposed algorithm. The channel gain is ηD−K , where
D is the distance between receiver and transmitter, K = 4 is
the path loss exponent and η is fast fading with exponential
distribution. The cell radius is 400 m. CUs are randomly
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Fig. 2: Convergence of time allocation estimation with M = 2, N = 2.
distributed in an area of at least 300 m away from the BS. The
distance between the DT and the BS is uniformly distributed
between 150 and 250 m. The length of D2D link is uniformly
distributed between 10 and 60 m. Besides, we set n0 = −100
dBm, pc = pd = 20 mW, αL = 0.1, αU = 0.5, ζ = ε0 = 0.1
and ξ = 0.2, and the length of memory in BRI is set to 4.
At first, we investigate the the convergence behavior of
the proposed learning algorithm. For illustration purposes, we
consider a small network with 2 CUs and 2 D2D pairs. There is
only one SM, where CU 1 is matched with D2D pair 2 and CU
2 is matched with D2D pair 1. The results are given in Fig. 2
and Fig. 3. The results are averaged over 1000 simulations with
the same topology. Fig. 2 presents the convergence of the time
allocation estimation, where the estimation αtmn is normalized
by the true value α∗mn. It is observed that the sequence
{
αtmn
}
converges to α∗mn asymptotically, which is consistent with
Theorem 3. The convergence of CUs’ behaviors is given in
Fig. 3. It can be found that CU 1 and CU 2 could acquire
their correct partners. This result implies that PNE or SM will
be achieved eventually.
Next, we compare the proposed algorithm with other dis-
tributed algorithms in a larger network with 4 CUs and 5
D2D pairs. Fig. 4 shows the achieved system throughput over
time for different algorithms. The results are averaged over
1000 simulations with different topologies. In the classical
exploration-exploitation ǫ-greedy algorithm, at each period,
every CU selects the best D2D pairs so far with probabil-
ity 1 − ǫ , and some random D2D pair with probability ǫ .
Besides, the time allocation estimations are updated similarly
to our algorithm. We take ǫ = 0.1 in the simulation. In the
random algorithm, each CU selects D2D pair randomly and
proposes αL as time allocation to guarantee its performance.
We present the non-cooperative scheme as well, where every
CU takes action b0. It can be observed that our algorithm
yields significant gain over other learning algorithms. Besides,
the performance loss due to incomplete information is small. It
is also worth mentioning that the cooperative scheme achieves
much better performance than non-cooperative scheme, which
verifies the efficiency of the cooperative scheme.
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(a) The behaviors of CU 1 over periods.
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(b) The behaviors of CU 2 over periods.
Fig. 3: The convergence of CUs’ behaviors with M = 2, N = 2.
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Fig. 4: Performance of the proposed algorithm compared to other
algorithms with M = 4, N = 5.
V. CONCLUSION
This paper considers a cooperative D2D communication
system with incomplete information. We model the pairing
6problem between multiple CUs and multiple D2D pairs as
a one-to-one matching game and propose a novel learning
algorithm, which converges to a stable matching. The sim-
ulation results verify our analysis and show that the proposed
algorithm outperforms the classical ǫ-greedy algorithm. In the
future work, the location information will be considered to
divide CUs and D2D pairs into small groups to speed up the
learning process. Moreover, the learning algorithm with faster
convergence rate will also be investigated.
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